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rft.atitle The Moral Insignificance of "Bare" Personal Reasons
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1573-0883
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rft.jtitle Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
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rft.date 2002-07-01
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rft.volume 110
abstract <p>Common sense supports the idea that we can have morally significant reasons for giving priority to the interests of persons for whom we have special concern. Yet there is a real question about the nature of such reasons. Many people seem to believe that there are biological or metaphysical special relations, such as family, race, religion or personal identity, which are in themselves morally important and thus supply reasons for special concern. I maintain that there are no grounds for accepting this. What matters morally, I argue, is the substance of personal or wider social relationships. My "substantivist" account of the source of morally salient reasons for special concern is positioned between nonreductionist and strong voluntarist views of special responsibilities. Substantivism is more plausible than these views and has important implications for how we approach morally weighing personal versus impartial reasons.</p>
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url https://www.jstor.org/stable/4321283
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author McPherson, Lionel K.
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description <p>Common sense supports the idea that we can have morally significant reasons for giving priority to the interests of persons for whom we have special concern. Yet there is a real question about the nature of such reasons. Many people seem to believe that there are biological or metaphysical special relations, such as family, race, religion or personal identity, which are in themselves morally important and thus supply reasons for special concern. I maintain that there are no grounds for accepting this. What matters morally, I argue, is the substance of personal or wider social relationships. My "substantivist" account of the source of morally salient reasons for special concern is positioned between nonreductionist and strong voluntarist views of special responsibilities. Substantivism is more plausible than these views and has important implications for how we approach morally weighing personal versus impartial reasons.</p>
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spelling McPherson, Lionel K. 0031-8116 1573-0883 Kluwer Academic Publishers https://www.jstor.org/stable/4321283 <p>Common sense supports the idea that we can have morally significant reasons for giving priority to the interests of persons for whom we have special concern. Yet there is a real question about the nature of such reasons. Many people seem to believe that there are biological or metaphysical special relations, such as family, race, religion or personal identity, which are in themselves morally important and thus supply reasons for special concern. I maintain that there are no grounds for accepting this. What matters morally, I argue, is the substance of personal or wider social relationships. My "substantivist" account of the source of morally salient reasons for special concern is positioned between nonreductionist and strong voluntarist views of special responsibilities. Substantivism is more plausible than these views and has important implications for how we approach morally weighing personal versus impartial reasons.</p> The Moral Insignificance of &#34;Bare&#34; Personal Reasons Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
spellingShingle McPherson, Lionel K., Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition, The Moral Insignificance of "Bare" Personal Reasons
title The Moral Insignificance of "Bare" Personal Reasons
title_full The Moral Insignificance of "Bare" Personal Reasons
title_fullStr The Moral Insignificance of "Bare" Personal Reasons
title_full_unstemmed The Moral Insignificance of "Bare" Personal Reasons
title_short The Moral Insignificance of "Bare" Personal Reasons
title_sort the moral insignificance of &#34;bare&#34; personal reasons
title_unstemmed The Moral Insignificance of "Bare" Personal Reasons
url https://www.jstor.org/stable/4321283