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container_title The Bell Journal of Economics
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description <p>This paper examines the welfare effects of fee splitting or kickbacks paid by one physician to another in return for patient referrals. This practice is regarded as unethical and illegal in most cases, but it is shown that in a principalagent context it is possible for fee splitting to offer incentives which actually improve patient welfare. Fee splitting occurs when there is a divergence between price and the referral partner's marginal opportunity cost. A restructuring of fee levels to yield physicians equal net income per unit time would remove the incentive for fee splitting. In the absence of this reform it is shown that fee splitting may induce the first-contact physician to refer instead of performing a lower quality procedure himself, and can also be a tool for eroding specialist monopoly power.</p>
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spelling Pauly, Mark V. 0361-915X American Telephone and Telegraph Company Short Articles https://www.jstor.org/stable/3003336 <p>This paper examines the welfare effects of fee splitting or kickbacks paid by one physician to another in return for patient referrals. This practice is regarded as unethical and illegal in most cases, but it is shown that in a principalagent context it is possible for fee splitting to offer incentives which actually improve patient welfare. Fee splitting occurs when there is a divergence between price and the referral partner's marginal opportunity cost. A restructuring of fee levels to yield physicians equal net income per unit time would remove the incentive for fee splitting. In the absence of this reform it is shown that fee splitting may induce the first-contact physician to refer instead of performing a lower quality procedure himself, and can also be a tool for eroding specialist monopoly power.</p> The Ethics and Economics of Kickbacks and Fee Splitting The Bell Journal of Economics
spellingShingle Pauly, Mark V., The Bell Journal of Economics, The Ethics and Economics of Kickbacks and Fee Splitting, Short Articles
title The Ethics and Economics of Kickbacks and Fee Splitting
title_full The Ethics and Economics of Kickbacks and Fee Splitting
title_fullStr The Ethics and Economics of Kickbacks and Fee Splitting
title_full_unstemmed The Ethics and Economics of Kickbacks and Fee Splitting
title_short The Ethics and Economics of Kickbacks and Fee Splitting
title_sort the ethics and economics of kickbacks and fee splitting
topic Short Articles
url https://www.jstor.org/stable/3003336